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In Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408 the Court of Appeal clarified the circumstances in 
which it is fair not to share. This is the first time an appellate court has directly determined 
whether the equal sharing principle can be relaxed in short, childless marriages, eleven years 
after the principle was originally articulated by the House of Lords in Miller v Miller; 
McFarlane v McFarlane [2016] UKHL 24. 
It is apt that Sharp was labelled ‘Miller-lite’ (para. [105]) by McFarlane LJ because it has 
similar facts to Miller but involves a lower level of wealth. The relationship was short, lasting 
six years (including the period of pre-marital cohabitation); the parties had no children, and 
are in their early forties. Both parties earned £100,000 per year at the beginning of the 
relationship, but the wife ultimately earned significantly more than the husband during the 
marriage as a result of bonuses totalling £10.5 million. One year before the marriage ended in 
2013, the husband took voluntary redundancy. An important distinguishing feature from 
Miller is that the parties were, according to the wife, ‘a genuine dual career family’ (para. 
[11]) that did not pool their finances, whereas in Miller the wife did not work.  
At first instance Sir Peter Singer applied the sharing principle set out in Miller and held that 
the husband should receive 50% of the matrimonial assets, totalling £2.725 million. He 
included the wife’s bonuses in the pot of matrimonial assets for division. It is understandable 
why the judge reached this conclusion. In Miller the House of Lords reasoned that the wife 
was entitled to £5 million because this reflected a share in the wealth acquired during the 
marriage. As Lord Nicholls said, short marriages are no less a partnership of equals (para. 
[17]). Therefore in Sharp, the bonuses were susceptible to division as they were acquired 
during the marriage. 
On appeal, the court set aside the first instance decision as to the division of capital and 
instead made a property adjustment order allocating the parties’ first home to the husband and 
the second home to the wife, with an additional lump sum payment of £900,000 to the 
husband. Significantly, the Court of Appeal did not include the wife’s liquid capital in the pot 
of matrimonial assets for equal sharing. And so her bonuses constituted non-matrimonial 
property. 
McFarlane LJ’s leading judgment depended on the interpretation of two important points: 
when the equal sharing principle can be departed from and where to draw the line between 
matrimonial and non-matrimonial assets in short, childless, dual career marriages.  
First, when considering the circumstances in which the equal sharing principle can be 
relaxed, McFarlane LJ held it was appropriate to depart from equal sharing as the nature of 
the relationship was such that there was no financial dependence between the parties. In a 
short marriage, there is less time for assets to be pooled. When there are no children, one 
party is not undertaking a double shift of work inside and outside the home, and so neither 
party made any career sacrifices as a result of childcare. Furthermore, the parties kept their 
finances separate throughout the relationship, with each paying half of the utility bills on their 
two properties and even splitting restaurant bills. Factors such as the husband’s lack of 
knowledge about his wife’s bonuses and the wife’s gift of three Aston Martin cars to the 
husband also reinforced the ‘marked degree’ (para. [7]) of separation of property in the 
marriage. In McFarlane LJ’s view, these cars would not have been gifts if they had been 
bought with joint matrimonial funds. Taken together, the nature of the relationship and the 
financial conduct of the parties implied an intention to depart from the sharing principle. 
Unlike the judge at first instance, the appellate court was clear that there is no authority to 
suggest that the parties must have entered into a prenuptial agreement in order to opt out of 
equal sharing (para. [112]).  
McFarlane LJ went on to consider Miller, where the Lords stated that departure from equal 
sharing is also justifiable if the property being divided is ‘non-matrimonial’. However, in 
Miller there was some disagreement as to whether assets generated by one party during the 
marriage will fall into the pot for equal division. As a result, another important part of 
McFarlane LJ’s judgment in Sharp was his conclusion that the wife’s bonuses were non-
matrimonial assets. 
At first instance, the classification of the wife’s bonuses as matrimonial depended largely on 
the time of their acquisition. If they had been acquired at an earlier date they may not be 
susceptible to division according to the equal sharing principle. The appellate court found a 
few difficulties with this analysis. McFarlane LJ believed it ‘unfair, in a blind arbitrary sense’ 
(para. [88]) if assets acquired six months before the marriage were non-matrimonial and not 
shared, but the same assets acquired six months after the marriage were matrimonial and 
divided in 50/50 shares. Furthermore, McCombe LJ warned that an inflexible approach is 
incompatible with statute, as it limits judicial discretion as conferred by section 23 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (para. [126]). There is no system of community property in this 
jurisdiction. To apply the sharing principle to all assets surplus to needs, solely because they 
were acquired during the marriage would prevent the court from considering the full range of 
factors set out in section 25 of the 1973 Act. For example, section 25 explicitly requires the 
court to consider the duration of the marriage and the parties’ contributions. On this basis it 
would be a fiction to suggest that Mr Sharp contributed, even indirectly, to the acquisition of 
Mrs Sharp’s bonuses (para. [54]). 
As the wife’s counsel referred to the ‘cocktail of factors’ in this case as being a ‘perfect 
storm’ (para. [59]), it could be argued that Sharp is too fact specific to have any important 
impact on the law of financial provision on divorce. Indeed, Sharp will only affect a small 
number of cases, because if one of the parties has made non-financial contributions to the 
marriage through work in the home, he or she will normally generate entitlement to assets 
such as bonuses, leading to a different outcome from Sharp (see Charman v Charman [2007] 
EWCA Civ 503). However, Sharp is significant because it has provided much needed 
clarification on how key issues from Miller are to be interpreted. This is particularly welcome 
given the Law Commission’s conclusion that the implications of non-matrimonial property 
must be explored further in the courts before any statutory reform of financial provision law 
is introduced (Law Com, 2014, para 1.40). 
One of the post-Miller issues to be clarified somewhat by Sharp is if the source of the parties’ 
assets affects whether they are matrimonial or non-matrimonial, because Baroness Hale and 
Lord Nicholls did not agree on this point in Miller.  In short marriages, Baroness Hale said 
there may be reason to exclude ‘unilateral’ assets from the matrimonial pot (Miller, para. 
[150]). Assets are unilateral if they have been generated solely by one party’s efforts, have 
not been generated by a business partnership and have not been acquired for the benefit of the 
family. From this perspective, the wife’s bonuses in Sharp truly are unilateral. However, in 
Miller Lord Nicholls preferred not to distinguish between family assets and non-family 
business assets. Whilst the majority in Miller preferred Baroness Hale’s approach, at first 
instance in Sharp Sir Peter Singer supported Lord Nicholls’ analysis. He reasoned that Lord 
Nicholls’ approach had been followed by the Court of Appeal in Charman, which displayed 
little enthusiasm for the concept of unilateral assets (para. [49]). Yet Charman did not involve 
a short, dual career marriage and Sharp did. In Sharp, the court found that although the 
concept of unilateral assets should be considered with care (para. [107]) it is appropriate in 
the present case. By deciding that Baroness Hale’s assessment of unilateral assets is to be 
preferred over Lord Nicholls’ view on the matter, the court in Sharp has settled an eleven 
year old debate as to the significance of non-business partnership, non-family assets in short 
marriages. This might not affect many cases in practice, but any clarification is welcome 
given repeated calls for reform of this area. 
Sharp has not unsettled the principles established in Miller, as the equal sharing principle will 
still ordinarily apply in cases where resources exceed needs. But it has clarified that the 
‘inescapable conclusion’ (para. [97]) of Miller is that there should be a possibility to alter the 
equal sharing principle in short, childless, dual career marriages. This case therefore 
underlines the importance of context in financial provision decisions, and will be reassuring 
to those sharing Cretney’s (2003) concerns that big money cases resemble community of 
property systems in all but name. 
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